Man's life is a quest. A lifelong journey towards his goal which is inscribed in the utmost recesses of his being, of "that which makes him what he is", of his nature. The goal and the intermediary steps toward that goal reveal themselves in greater clarity to the wayfarer as he goes along. He is directed by his own nature to the goal. Movement toward the goal is good.

Virtue is that which makes man good (I II, 55.4). The beginning of virtue, virtue's nursery, is obeying the law (I II, 63.1)

The purpose of the Unity of Law and Virtue Project is to demonstrate the continuum between law and virtue in the development of the good person. To accomplish this we have chosen to use those parts of the Summa Theologicae of Thomas Aquinas which so closely parallel the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, i.e., the Treatise on Law (I-II 90 - 108) and the Treatise on Virtue (I II, 55-67). These sections comprise relatively few of the 3,108 articles of the Summa Theologicae. Much goes before and much more comes after.

But let's start with Aristotle.

Everyone who has the power to live according to his own choice should set up for himself some object for the good life...since not to have one's life organized in view of some end is a sign of much folly. Eudaimonean Ethics 1214b 6-10

Aristotle's ethic is teleological, (from 'telos': a Greek word meaning end, goal, or purpose).

The telos of a life represents that life's fullness... The teleological language of goal, purpose, and aim underscores the conviction that to be human is to have some good to become, some good into which we must grow and according to which we must be formed if we are to understand what being human means at all... There is something specific, something highly exact, that must happen to a person if his or her life is not to be judged a failure...In a teleological ethic the central moral question is aways the same: What must I do with myself if my life is not to be judged a failure? To have a morality is to have an answer to that question.

In order to be there is something we have to become. It is not enough to be, simply to exist, for existence requires the transformation of the self into the good by which existence is defined. To exist is to become something more, it is life qualified by the purpose and goal which represent its completeness. In a teleological ethic, being implies becoming, and becoming implies the appropriation of a good which enables moral existence. To be is to be for something and the telos represented precisely what that something was, namely the good the possession of which was human fullness.

Paul J. Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, Chapter 2.II "Making Good on Life's Purpose: What Aristotle's Ethic is All About"

The end is the starting point. What is the end? In considering man's purpose, Aristotle settled on eudaimonia, happiness.

Aristotle recognized that what he identified as our happiness only imperfectly realized the definition of happiness he himself set down in the Nichomachean Ethics. The account Aristotle gave of happiness - as self-sufficient, as such that, once had, it could not be lost, and so on - is of something that can be realized in this life only imperfectly.

Ralph McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, The Catholic University Press, Washington, D. C., p. 37.

Thomas concurs:

The imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists. (I II 5.5)

Ralph McInerny is convinced that Thomas demonstrates that "it is possible to formulate true practical guidelines as to how in this life happiness can be acheived, and the truth of such precepts is independent of the truths that are held to be such only on the basis of divine faith." Ibid, p. 38.

In other words, at the level of moral philosophy, there is no chasm between Aristotle and Thomas caused by the later's acceptance of revealed truths. In fact, at the crucial points, when answering such questions as "Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?" (I II 5,7) and "Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?" (I II 3,8), we find Thomas invoking Aristotle to prove his arguements!

We will try to be faithful to this approach and remain within the confines of "natural theology", the knowledge of God that can be acheived by human reason alone, fully aware that such an approach unnecessarily constrains us from satisfying our deepest longing: to be like God.

Notes:

• We have created a separate page for each question of the Summa within our purview. Each page has the text of the question above and our commentary below (the horizontal dividing bar can be moved up or down).
• These pages include only the Treatise on Law. The second part, the Treatise on Virtue, is still under development.
• A note on citations: The Summa has three parts (I, II, III) and the second part is again divided into two parts (I II and II II). Each part has questions (I II 94), then articles (I II 94, 2) and then objections (I II 94, 2 obj 1) and replies to objections (I II 94, 2 ad 1).
• The Moral Agent: Let us make a personal note on the moral agent, the one who acts. In much of the most recent literature the moral agent is a woman and she is often misbehaving. We have chosen to use the masculine pronoun and hope this does not prevent female readers from identifying with the moral agent, especially when demonstrating edifying behavior.

The Summa theologicae of St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologicae of Thomas Aquinas is an explanation of the whole of reality, of all that is. Reading it is much like going to the dentist: without the necessary preparation the experience will be so painful you will never want to go back. Special terminology is used which is barely understandable to the modern mind. To make the reading of Summa Theologicae as painless as possible we will present the most important concepts either in the introduction or in the continuous commentary. The student who takes the time to learn the concepts so as to truly comprehend the content of Thomas' thought will be justly rewarded.

God and Creation

Aristotle's world is anthropocentric, man-centered, but with something transcendental, something in the realm of the divine. Thomas turns this inside-out. Employing Aristotle's theory of knowledge, he explains creation as an idea originating in the mind of God who is ipsum esse subsistens, "autonomous existence".

The knowledge of God is the cause of all things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artist is to things made by his act. Now the knowledge of the artist is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artist works by his intellect. I 14,8

Therefore, there is design and purpose throughout the universe.

Each created thing has a nature which determines how it acts, what it can do and how it does it. The lowest level of creation is inanimate (un-souled) objects. Then animate objects, distinguished as plants and animals. All of these are irrational creatures.

Human Being: At the peak of created things stands the human being, as designed by God for a purpose. Man is a unity of body and soul and, by nature, has something in common with each level of created things and, especially, with animals. The human being, man, is a rational creature, having that which the irrational creature does not have: reason. "The rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational." I II 93.6

Human act: The acts of irrational creatures are merely functions of their nature. To be worthy of the name human an act must contain that which differentiates man from the act of an irrational creature and makes him "master of his actions" I II 1,1, namely, the use of reason and will. This means that man's acts are directed to an end. I II 1,2. The human act is performed consciously (the end is "fixed by reason"), freely (proceeds from a "deliberate will") and for a purpose ("in accordance with reason"). Every human act is a voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end. We define our moral character by the free choice of our acts which conform, or do not conform, to our true good. Therefore, "moral acts are the same as human acts" I II 1,3.

Reason: The human act relies on the use of reason because it is the function of reason to direct acts to their end. As we shall see shortly, law is related primarily to reason, not to will, choice, opinion polls or a democratic majority. Due to its central role in the human act and the definition of law, an understanding of reason is critical.

Reason is of two kinds: practical and speculative (theoretical). Thomas assumes that the reader is fully informed on speculative reason and therefore constantly compares practical reason to speculative reason. For some of us a bit of background is helpful. There are two tasks of speculative reason. The first is apprehension; to know things by abstraction from the things themselves. "We must not overlook the fact that reason here not only includes but means the essential relation to reality. It is nothing else than the power of man to take into himself the truth of real things." Josef Pieper, Living the Truth p. 116. "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" I 16,1

The second task of speculative reason is similar to the task of practical reason: to proceed from naturally-known, self-evident, general and indemonstrable principles to the more particular determination of certain matters, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature but acquired by the efforts of reason.

Speculative reason is concerned with necessary things. Its object is the consideration of the TRUTH. The work of the speculative reason is unerring and leads to science.

Practical reason is concerned with singular and contingent things; with doing "this" or "that". Its object is the GOOD, directed to a particular action at a particular moment. Here there is room for error. The work of the practical reason is the government of the human person and leads to law and virtue.

Both the speculative reason and the practical reason begin with principles which are self-evident. The self-evident principles of the speculative reason are called "first principles of demonstration". The self-evident principles of the practical reason are called the "precepts of the natural law".

Self-evident (I II 94,2): Self-evident truths are not demonstrable. They are the first principles from which other truths can be demonstrated. Self-evidence can be considered in two ways: 1. in itself, when the predicate contains the notion of the subject (a basic rule of logic). Thus, "A triangle has three sides." 2. in relation to us: the logically self-evident principles may not be self-evident to a particular person who does not understand one or the other of the terms. Not all self-evident principles are easy to grasp: "Some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meanings of the terms of such propositions" which are "not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp them." (I II 94,2)

Man first apprehends being "the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends." I II 94,2. This being is grasped as TRUTH by the speculative reason and as GOOD by the practical reason.

What is produced by the act of reason? The reason issues dictates ("dictates of reason"). With regard to the speculative reason these dictates are assertions: "first of all the definition; secondly, the propositions; thirdly, the syllogism or argument." (I II 90.1 ad 2) With regard to the practical reason, these dictates are commands (I II 92.2) and have the nature of law. (I II 90.1 ad 2)

This commentary has not been classroom tested. Please send us critical comments to help us improve the content. Your questions are also helpful in this regard.

You can download all documents here.